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Kinga Morsanyi1*, Chiara Busdraghi2 and Caterina Primi2Abstract
Background: When asked to solve mathematical problems, some people experience anxiety and threat, which can
lead to impaired mathematical performance (Curr Dir Psychol Sci 11:181–185, 2002). The present studies investigated
the link between mathematical anxiety and performance on the cognitive reflection test (CRT; J Econ Perspect
19:25–42, 2005). The CRT is a measure of a person’s ability to resist intuitive response tendencies, and it correlates
strongly with important real-life outcomes, such as time preferences, risk-taking, and rational thinking.
Methods: In Experiments 1 and 2 the relationships between maths anxiety, mathematical knowledge/mathematical
achievement, test anxiety and cognitive reflection were analysed using mediation analyses. Experiment 3 included a
manipulation of working memory load. The effects of anxiety and working memory load were analysed using ANOVAs.
Results: Our experiments with university students (Experiments 1 and 3) and secondary school students (Experiment 2)
demonstrated that mathematical anxiety was a significant predictor of cognitive reflection, even after controlling for
the effects of general mathematical knowledge (in Experiment 1), school mathematical achievement (in Experiment 2)
and test anxiety (in Experiments 1–3). Furthermore, Experiment 3 showed that mathematical anxiety and burdening
working memory resources with a secondary task had similar effects on cognitive reflection.
Conclusions: Given earlier findings that showed a close link between cognitive reflection, unbiased decisions and
rationality, our results suggest that mathematical anxiety might be negatively related to individuals’ ability to make
advantageous choices and good decisions.
Keywords: Cognitive reflection test, Decision making, Dual-task manipulation, Heuristics and biases, Mathematical
anxiety, Numeracy, Rationality, Test anxiety, Working memoryBackground
Although children begin their formal education with a
very positive view of mathematics [1,2], as they progress
through education, many of them develop negative feelings
and attitudes (cf., [3]). The feeling of tension, apprehension
and fear experienced when faced with maths content has
been termed mathematical anxiety [4]. Maths anxiety
interferes with mathematics performance and it leads to
negative maths-related attitudes and self-perceptions,
an avoidance of elective maths courses, and it also
affects people’s career opportunities and career choices* Correspondence: k.morsanyi@qub.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.[5]. Whereas the negative consequences of maths anxiety
on educational outcomes are well-known, it is less clear
whether maths anxiety also affects people’s behaviour in
other contexts.
It is known that, at the population level, low numeracy
is associated with reduced economic productivity [6],
higher rates of unemployment, mental and physical illness,
as well as higher rates of arrest and incarceration [7]. Low
numeracy also impairs risk comprehension, and leads to
biases in judgment and decision making (see [8,9] for
reviews). Nevertheless, the link between low numeracy
and maths anxiety is not so clear-cut. Several studies
investigated the effects of maths anxiety in educational
contexts. Although correlations of around -.30 have been
reported between mathematics anxiety and mathematicsal Ltd. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/2.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
g/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article,
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tions might be inflated, because mathematics achievement
in these studies is typically based on measures collected in
high-stakes test situations, which are especially likely to
induce anxiety (cf., [11]). Other studies (e.g., [12]) found a
link between maths anxiety and arithmetic performance
in experimental settings. Although these findings suggest
that maths anxiety can lead to suboptimal maths per-
formance, it is not the case that maths anxiety is neces-
sarily associated with low levels of numeracy or poor
maths performance (cf., [13,14]).
Lab-based investigations have revealed the cognitive
mechanisms underpinning the negative effects of maths
anxiety. When solving arithmetical problems, participants
with high maths anxiety have higher error rates, they have
problems with rejecting incorrect solutions (even when
these are highly implausible), and these effects are espe-
cially prominent in the case of more complex problems
which require a carry operation (e.g., [15,16]). Participants
with high maths anxiety also often show a characteristic
pattern of responding quickly to problems, displaying a
“local avoidance” of the uncomfortable test situation (cf.,
[13,16]), and probably decreasing their chances of generat-
ing correct responses. Studies have also indicated that
maths anxiety has an online effect on maths performance
through hampering working memory resources [12,17].
It is easy to imagine how maths anxiety might emerge
in, and impact on some everyday situations, such as
estimating the price of purchases, splitting the bill in a
restaurant, choosing between electricity suppliers, or
deciding on investment options. For example, Silk and
Parrott [18] reported that participants’ maths anxiety
increased after they were presented with statistical
information about the health risks associated with
consuming genetically modified food. These authors also
reported a negative association between maths anxiety
and numeracy, as well as between maths anxiety and the
ability to interpret health statistics. Nevertheless, the effect
of maths anxiety on the everyday functioning of individ-
uals, and, in particular, their ability to make good deci-
sions is unknown. Thus, the aim of the following studies
was to explore the link between mathematical anxiety and
a short test which was found to be highly predictive of in-
dividuals’ decision-making skills: the Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT; [19]). Additionally, we were also interested in
whether the link between maths anxiety and cognitive
reflection is also present when participants’ maths know-
ledge and maths achievement are taken into account. In
order to investigate these questions, in Experiment 1, we
used a test of basic mathematical knowledge, which was
specifically developed for university students [20]. This
test can also be considered as a measure of numeracy, and
it was administered in a low-stakes situation, as part of
the research study. In Experiment 2, participants’ finalsecondary school maths grades were used. This was
intended as an ecologically valid indicator of maths
achievement in an academic setting.
The CRT [19] is a short test measuring a person’s ten-
dency to override an intuitively compelling response, and
to engage in further reflection which can lead to a correct
solution. Although the CRT was not intended as a
decision-making test per se, but as a “simple measure of
one type of cognitive ability” ([19], p. 26), both Frederick
[19] and others (e.g., [21-23] demonstrated that it was
highly predictive of performance on tests of decision-
making ability. As an example, consider the following
item:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00
more than the ball. How much does the ball cost? ______
cents
Although the correct response is 5 cents, many partici-
pants give the response “10 cents”, which seems to pop
into mind effortlessly. Cognitive reflection involves the
ability to effectively monitor and correct impulsive re-
sponse tendencies.
Cognitive reflection was found to be negatively related to
temporal discounting (i.e., the tendency to prefer smaller,
immediately available rewards over larger rewards which
will be available later), and positively related to choosing
gambles with higher expected values [19]. Further studies
showed that the CRT was also related to some typical
heuristics and biases [21-23]. One could argue that
these relationships are unsurprising, given that the CRT
is based on mathematical word problems, and many of
these judgment and decision-making tasks also contain
numerical information. However, the CRT was also
related to tasks containing no numerical information
(for example, syllogistic reasoning, which measured the
effect of beliefs on logical reasoning; see [23]). Further-
more, although the CRT correlates with measures of
intelligence and numeracy (e.g., [19,24]) it was found to
explain additional variance in reasoning and decision-
making tasks when it was administered together with
measures of intelligence and numeracy [21,23,25]. Overall,
these results demonstrate that the CRT is a very powerful
predictor of a person’s ability to make unbiased judgments
and rational decisions on a variety of tasks.
In sum, in the studies that we report below we tested
the hypothesis that maths anxiety might be related to
performance on the CRT. We based this prediction on
the observation that maths anxiety leads to a tendency
to generate and accept responses quickly, without taking
the opportunity to check solutions and correct mistakes,
and to accept incorrect responses even when these are
highly implausible (cf., [16]). In other words, it seems
that maths anxiety reduces cognitive reflection.
It could be argued that a potential link between maths
anxiety and cognitive reflection would be unsurprising,
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Thus, we also aimed at showing that even when the effect
of mathematical abilities or mathematical achievement
is controlled for, the link between maths anxiety and
cognitive reflection would still be present. We based
this prediction on earlier claims that the CRT is “not
just another numeracy scale” (cf., [21]; p.361), but also a
potent indicator of a person’s ability to avoid tempting,
easy-to-generate heuristic responses [19]. This predic-
tion is also in line with Campitelli and Gerrans [25] who
found that the ability to inhibit the effect of beliefs on
logical reasoning explained additional variance in the
CRT, when the effects of numeracy were already taken
into account. The prediction that the link between the
CRT and maths anxiety is not fully mediated by maths
knowledge or maths achievement is key to our account,
as we aim to show that mathematical anxiety is nega-
tively related to individuals’ ability to avoid the typical
pitfalls of reasoning and decision-making.
Additionally, in line with a recent study [26] we wanted
to control for the effects of test anxiety. This is important,
as maths anxiety and test anxiety show moderate correla-
tions, and it has been argued that maths anxiety could be
just a form of test anxiety ([27], although see [28]).
In summary, in the studies that we report below, we
tested the prediction that maths anxiety is linked to
relatively poor performance on the CRT, even when
the effects of general mathematical knowledge or
school maths achievement, and test anxiety are taken
into account. We tested this prediction in two popula-
tions: secondary school and university students. In our
final study we also investigate the cognitive mechanisms
behind the link between maths anxiety and cognitive
reflection.Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 we tested the prediction that maths
anxiety is negatively related to cognitive reflection.
Specifically, we tested a path model in which math-
ematical anxiety is directly related to poor perform-
ance on the CRT. Additionally, we hypothesized an
indirect link between maths anxiety and cognitive re-
flection through general mathematics knowledge. Finally,
we also tested the potential effect of test anxiety on these
links.Method
Participants
The participants were 328 female psychology students
(Mage = 20.8; SD = 3; range 18 to 53 years) from the
University of Florence, Italy. a All students participated
on a voluntary basis, and they were offered ungraded
course credit for their participation.Materials
Cognitive reflection test (CRT; [19]): The CRT is a
three-item test which consists of word problems includ-
ing numerical information (see an example item above). A
single composite score was calculated, based on the sum
of correct responses. We administered an Italian version
of the items. In this version, the task that we described
above was modified in the following way. We included
euros instead of dollars, and the bat and the ball were
changed to a chocolate bar and a piece of candy. The
other two items were translated into Italian without
any modification of the content. In the present sample,
Cronbach’s alpha was .57.
Mathematics Prerequisites for Psychometrics (MPP;
[20]): This test was developed with the aim of measuring
the mathematics skills needed by students enrolling in
introductory statistics courses. The scale was constructed
applying item response theory analyses, and its reliability
and validity were tested. The test consists of 30 problems,
and it has a multiple-choice format (one correct response
out of four alternatives). A single composite, based on the
sum of correct responses, was calculated. In the present
sample.
Cronbach’s alpha was .80. We used this measure as an
estimate of students’ maths knowledge.
Abbreviated Maths Anxiety Scale (AMAS, [29]; see
details on the Italian adaptation of the scale in [30]).
This 9-item scale measures maths anxiety experienced
by students in learning and test situations. High scores
indicate high levels of anxiety. Participants have to re-
spond on the basis of how anxious they would feel during
the events specified, using a 5-point response scale (ran-
ging from 1 = low anxiety to 5 = high anxiety). An example
item is: “Thinking about an upcoming math test one day
before”. A single composite score was obtained, based on
participants’ ratings of each statement. Previous studies
showed that the AMAS has satisfactory reliability and
validity [29,31]. In the present sample Cronbach’s alpha
was .86.
Test Anxiety Inventory (TAI, [32]). The scale contains
20 items designed to measure anxiety associated with
test-taking situations. Reliability coefficients, and conver-
gent validity with other measures of test anxiety are strong
[33]. Participants have to respond on the basis of how they
would generally feel during the events specified using a
4-point response scale (ranging from 1 = almost never to
4 = almost always). An example item is: “Thinking about
my grade in a course interferes with my work on tests”.
The Italian version of the TAI was obtained from the
English version using the forward-translation method.
Two non-professional translators worked independently,
and then they compared their translations with the pur-
pose of assessing equivalence. Subsequently, a group of
five people read this first version, revised it, and eventually
Figure 1 Path model depicting the relationships between maths
anxiety, maths knowledge, and cognitive reflection (a, b, c’ are
unstandardized OLS regression coefficients);* p < .05 **p < .01;
***p < .001).
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tained, based on participants’ ratings of each statement. In
our sample Cronbach’s alpha was .93.
Procedure
The scales were presented in a paper-and-pencil format,
and students participated in groups of around 40. They
worked through the CRT and the questionnaires individu-
ally. The order of presentation was: MPP, TAI, AMAS and
CRT. Participants were informed that participation was
voluntary and anonymous, and they were asked to give
written informed consent. The average administration
time was 50 minutes.
Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for our measures,
and the correlations between them. As expected, maths
anxiety and maths knowledge were both significantly corre-
lated with cognitive reflection, and maths anxiety was also
significantly (negatively) correlated with maths knowledge.
Additionally, mathematical anxiety was also related to test
anxiety.
To better understand the mechanism underlying the
relationships between these variables, we tested the hy-
pothesis that maths knowledge mediates the effect of
maths anxiety on cognitive reflection (see Figure 1).
Recently, researchers [34,35] have recommended the
use of the bootstrapping procedure over the Sobel test
in assessing indirect effects of mediation models, since the
bootstrapping procedure does not impose the assumption
of normality of the sampling distribution on indirect ef-
fects. In our study, the mediaton hypothesis was tested
with SPSS macro (the INDIRECT procedure) for boot-
strapping (with 5000 bootstrap samples) to estimate 95%
confidence interval (CI; for more details, see Preacher and
Hayes [36]).
We estimated the indirect effect of maths anxiety on
cognitive reflection, quantified as the product of the
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression coefficient
estimating maths knowledge from maths anxiety (path a
in Figure 1), and the OLS regression coefficient estimating
cognitive reflection from maths knowledge controlling forTable 1 Correlations between cognitive reflection, maths
knowledge, and maths and test anxiety, and descriptive
statistics for each measure
1 2 3 4
1. Cognitive reflection –
2. Maths knowledge .45*** –
3. Maths anxiety -.20*** -.17** –
4. Test anxiety -.05 -.05 .54*** –
M (SD) .90 (.94) 22.6 (4.5) 24.1 (6.5) 43.6 (11.8)
**p < .01; ***p < .001.math anxiety (path b in Figure 1). A bias-corrected
bootstrap-confidence interval (CI) of the product of
these paths that does not include zero provides evidence
of a significant indirect effect of maths anxiety on cogni-
tive reflection through maths knowledge [36]. The INDIR-
ECT procedure revealed a significant indirect effect of
maths anxiety on cognitive reflection through maths
knowledge (point estimate - .01, 95% CI = − .02 to - .004).
Kappa squared was 0.074 (95% CI = .026, to .128) indicat-
ing a medium effect size for the indirect effect [37].
Figure 1 also shows the significant parameter associated
with path c’ which indicates a direct effect of maths anx-
iety on the CRT. More specifically, participants with high
maths anxiety were less likely to give a correct answer to
the CRT items. In sum, the results show that, when the
effect of maths knowledge on cognitive reflection was
controlled for, the link between maths anxiety and cogni-
tive reflection was still significant. Overall, the results indi-
cate that the link between maths anxiety and the CRT was
partially mediated by mathematical knowledge, but even
when this effect was controlled for, there was a direct link
between maths anxiety and the CRT. Finally, we inves-
tigated whether these effects were affected by test anx-
iety. We included test anxiety as a covariate in the
mediation model simultaneously with the other pre-
dictor variables. Controlling for the effects of this
covariate did not substantially change the relationships
between maths anxiety, maths knowledge and cogni-
tive reflection, and the effect of test anxiety was not
significant (p = .30).
Discussion
In Experiment 1 we tested the prediction that maths
anxiety is negatively linked to cognitive reflection, and
that this effect is present even when the potential in-
direct effects of maths anxiety through maths know-
ledge are controlled for. We expected this on the basis
of earlier findings which showed that maths anxiety
leads to a tendency to impulsively accept incorrect
responses, without much reflection, at least in the case
of arithmetic problems (cf., [16]). We also tested the
Table 2 Correlations between cognitive reflection, maths
achievement, and maths and test anxiety, and descriptive
statistics for each measure
1 2 3 4
1. Cognitive reflection –
2. Maths achievement .29*** –
3. Maths anxiety -.20** -.22** –
4. Test anxiety .03 -.06 .49*** –
M (SD) .64 (.96) 6.4 (1.3) 23.1 (7.9) 47.01 (13.7)
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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anxiety, maths knowledge and cognitive reflection.
The results were in line with our predictions. Specific-
ally, we have found both a direct link between maths
anxiety and cognitive reflection, and an indirect link
through maths knowledge. These results have several
implications. One is that the effects of maths anxiety are
not only present in the case of arithmetical operations
which involve high computational demands, and are pre-
sented in the form of numbers and symbols, but also in
the case of word problems with numerical content, where
mathematical symbols are not used. Indeed, to the best of
our knowledge, our study was the first to test the effect of
maths anxiety on the ability to solve maths word prob-
lems. Nevertheless, our aim was not simply to demon-
strate this link. Indeed, the CRT is considered to be more
than just a maths task (cf. [21]). We expected, and found,
that the link between maths anxiety and cognitive reflec-
tion was not simply the consequence of lower numeracy
levels, or a reduced ability to apply maths knowledge in
highly maths anxious individuals. Indeed, when we con-
trolled for the effect of maths knowledge (as measured by
the MPP), the link between maths anxiety and cognitive
reflection was still significant. Overall, our results suggest
that maths anxiety is linked to performance on the CRT
in two ways: directly, and through an association with
reduced maths knowledge.
Nevertheless, a weakness of our method is that we
assessed maths knowledge as part of the experimental
session. It could be argued that given the low-stakes
situation, the effect of maths anxiety on maths knowledge
was reduced, which could have decreased our chances of
detecting a full mediation effect of maths knowledge
between maths anxiety and cognitive reflection. We
addressed this issue in Experiment 2.
Experiment 2
In order to obtain a more ecologically valid measure of
maths performance in a high-stakes situation, in Experi-
ment 2 we included a measure of school maths achieve-
ment instead of a measure of maths knowledge. The other
purpose of our study was to extend our investigation to a
different population: secondary school students.
Method
Participants
184 secondary school students participated in the study
(Mage = 15.9; SD = .80; 15–19 years; 47% females). The
participants were recruited from four secondary schools
in a suburban area in Italy (Tuscany). A detailed study
protocol that explained the study’s goal and method-
ology was approved by the institutional review boards of
each school. Students received an information sheet,
which assured them that the data obtained from themwould be handled confidentially and anonymously, and
they were asked to give written informed consent. Parents
of minors were required to provide consent for their
child’s participation. All the youth invited to participate
agreed to do so.Materials and procedure
As in the previous study, the Italian versions of the CRT,
the AMAS, and the TAI were administered. Once again, all
measures displayed good reliability (Cronbach’s alphas for
the AMAS, TAI and CRT were .86, .93 and .68, respect-
ively). As an indicator of maths achievement, the final sec-
ondary school maths grades were used (range: 0–10). The
scales were presented in a paper-and-pencil format, and
were administered to students in a classroom setting during
school time. Students were provided with a brief introduc-
tion to the study, and with some instructions on how to
complete the questionnaires. The order of presentation was
the same as in Study 1.Results
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for our measures,
and the correlations between them. As in Experiment 1,
maths anxiety and maths achievement were both signifi-
cantly correlated with cognitive reflection, and maths
anxiety was also significantly (negatively) correlated with
maths achievement. The relationship between maths and
test anxiety was also significant.
We tested the mediation hypothesis using the INDIR-
ECT [36] procedure with 5,000 bootstrap samples. The
results revealed a significant indirect effect of maths anx-
iety on cognitive reflection through maths achievement
(estimate point -.007, 95% CI = − 0.014 to - 0.002). Kappa
squared was .056 (95% CI = .017, to .112) indicating a
medium effect size for the indirect effect [37].
The parameter associated with path c’ was also signifi-
cant, indicating a direct effect of maths anxiety on the
CRT. Overall, these results show that, once the mediat-
ing effect of maths achievement was controlled for, the
effect of maths anxiety on cognitive reflection was still
significant.
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fected by gender and test anxiety, we - simultaneously
with all other predictor variables- included them in the
mediation model. Controlling for the effect of these co-
variates did not substantially change the relationships
between maths anxiety, maths knowledge and cognitive
reflection. We also tested whether the covariates had a
significant effect on cognitive reflection, and found that
all of these effects were non-significant [Figure 2].
Discussion
The aim of Experiment 2 was to extend our investigation
to a different population, whilst we also used a more
ecologically valid indicator of maths performance in
high-stakes situations (i.e., course performance). The results
confirmed our initial findings: maths anxiety predicted
cognitive reflection, even when the effects of maths
achievement and test anxiety were controlled for.
Whereas these results clearly demonstrate that there is
a reliable association between maths anxiety and cogni-
tive reflection, the causal link between these constructs
is unclear. We hypothesized that maths anxiety led to a
reduction in cognitive reflection. Nevertheless, in theory,
it is also possible that reduced cognitive reflection leads
to increased maths anxiety. Thus, one aim of our final
study was to better understand the link between maths
anxiety and cognitive reflection.
Ashcraft and Kirk [12] demonstrated that the effects
of maths anxiety arose from the burden that anxious
thoughts imposed on WM. Specifically, they showed that
when participants’ WM was burdened by a secondary
task, the effects of maths anxiety were especially apparent
in the case of addition problems which included a carry
operation (e.g., 17 + 25). That is, it appeared that the
WM-load imposed by anxious thoughts, the carry oper-
ation and the secondary task added up, and disproportion-
ately affected anxious participants’ performance, as
compared to non-anxious participants, whose perform-
ance declined to a smaller degree under a dual-task load.
Other lines of research [38,39] demonstrated that in
the case of tasks which involved a conflict between a
heuristic and a normatively correct response, employingFigure 2 Path model depicting the relationships between maths
anxiety, maths achievement, and cognitive reflection (a, b, c’ are
unstandardized OLS regression coefficients; *p < .05;**p < .01).a dual-task load decreased normative performance, and
increased participants’ tendency to give a heuristic response.
Given that the CRT problems involve a heuristic-normative
conflict, we expected that a dual-task load will lead to a re-
duction in normative responding. This prediction is also in
line with Toplak et al. [23] who found a correlation between
working memory capacity and performance on the CRT.
In summary, in Experiment 3 we tested the hypothesis
that the relationship between maths anxiety and perform-
ance on the CRT was similar to the relationship between
available WM capacity and performance on the CRT.
Experiment 3
In our last experiment, we adopted a procedure which
was previously used by De Neys [38], and Gillard et al.
[39]. In these studies, participants had to memorize
either simple or complex dot patterns (see Figure 3). That
is, participants were allocated into either a low or a high
WM-load condition. Additionally, De Neys [38] also
included a control condition with no WM-load. In
both studies, besides remembering the dot patterns,
the participants were also asked to solve problems with
a conflict between a tempting heuristic response and a
normative response. We adopted the design used by
De Neys [38] in the present study.
As we described above, in the case of tasks with a
conflict between a heuristic and a normatively correct
response, it has been demonstrated that burdening par-
ticipants’ WM with a secondary task leads to an increase
in heuristic and a reduction in correct responding [38,39].
The CRT is a task with conflicting heuristic and correct
responses, and a previous study demonstrated that per-
formance on the CRT was linked to WM-capacity [23].
Based on the idea that anxiety burdens WM resources
(e.g., [12]), we hypothesized that WM load and anxiety
will be linked to reasoning performance in a similar
way. That is, we expected that both WM-load and maths
anxiety would be linked to poor performance on the CRT.
Besides their relationship with reasoning accuracy, we
were also interested in how WM-load and maths anxiety
were related to reaction times on the CRT, participants’
evaluations of their performance (that is, their estimate
of how many of the CRT problems they were able to
solve correctly, after completing the tasks), and their
self-reported anxiety that they experienced while complet-
ing the tasks. The purpose of including these additional
measures was to better understand the mechanisms
through which anxiety and working memory load are
linked to cognitive reflection. Whereas there are good rea-
sons to expect that anxious participants will rush through
the tasks (cf., [13,16]), show lower confidence in their per-
formance (e.g., [40]), and report higher levels of anxiety
while solving the CRT problems, WM-load in itself might
not be associated with such changes. In addition, including
Figure 3 Examples of the dot patterns used in the high and low load conditions.
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they worked through the problems made it possible to
assess the ecological validity of the AMAS with regard
to solving the CRT problems.
Finally, in Experiments 1 and 2, in our path models we
assumed that the negative relationship between mathemat-
ical anxiety and cognitive reflection arose because mathem-
atical anxiety reduced cognitive reflection. Nevertheless, in
theory, it is also possible that reduced cognitive reflection
leads to increased maths anxiety. If this was the case, the
WM-load manipulation (which is expected to reduce cog-
nitive reflection) should lead to an increase in participants’
levels of anxiety while they are working through the tasks.
Method
Participants
Eighty-nine students from a UK university participated
in the study (66 females; Mage = 22 years 4 months; SD =
8.11; range: 18–56 years). The participants were recruited
from undergraduate and postgraduate psychology courses,
and they were either offered ungraded course credit or a
small payment for participation. 31 participants (8 males)
were allocated to the control group, 29 participants (8
males) were allocated to the low load, and 29 participants
(7 males) were allocated to the high load condition.
Materials and procedure
Measures of mathematical and test anxiety Maths
anxiety was assessed by the AMAS (Cronbach’s alpha: .92),
and test anxiety was assessed by the TAI (Cronbach’s
alpha: .96).
Long version of the Cognitive Reflection Test In this
experiment we administered an 8-item version of the
CRT. We developed this version in order to be able to
discriminate between individual’s cognitive reflection
skills with higher precision, and to reduce the proportion
of participants who score 0 on the test. The items in this
long version included the 3 original CRT items. 5 more
items were added, which included 3 items based onmodified versions of additional CRT items developed by
Frederick (these items were not published previously), one
item based on a modification of a task used by Gillard
et al. [39], and an additional item developed by us. These
items were obtained through an iterative process, whereby
items with sub-optimal properties were modified or re-
moved from initial longer versions of the scale. The
eventually obtained 8-item version of the CRT was
pre-tested on a sample of 560 undergraduate students.
This pre-testing confirmed that (similarly to the original
CRT test) the vast majority of participants generated ei-
ther the typical heuristic (61% of responses) or the correct
response (33% of responses) to these items. The scale was
highly reliable (Cronbach’s alpha: .78). Detailed analyses of
the psychometric properties of the scale are reported in
Primi, C., Morsanyi, K., Donati, M., Chiesi, F.: The develop-
ment and testing of a new version of the Cognitive Reflection
Test applying Item Response Theory (IRT). in submission.
In the present study the 8-item version of the CRT
was presented on the computer with the modification
that participants were not asked to generate responses,
but they had to select from three response options: the
typical heuristic response, the correct response, and an
atypical response. The atypical response was chosen to be
dissimilar from both other responses, and it was also a re-
sponse that no participants had spontaneously generated
during the pre-testing of the items. We chose a forced
choice format, because we wanted to minimize the
number of incorrect responses stemming from arith-
metical errors (as opposed to incorrect mathematical rea-
soning). Given that correct response rates on the CRT are
generally low (around 30%), and that we administered the
problems together with a secondary task, it was important
to avoid a floor effect. Cronbach’s alpha in the present ex-
periment was .69.
The secondary task was the Dot Memory Task (DMT),
a classic spatial storage task previously used by De Neys
[38] and Gillard et al. [39]. A 3x3 matrix, filled with
three or four dots was presented (see Figure 3). Partici-
pants had as much time as they needed to memorize the
Figure 4 The effects of maths anxiety and cognitive load on
performance on the cognitive reflection tasks (error bars
represent 95% confidence intervals).
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to recall the dot pattern afterwards by clicking on the
appropriate cells of the matrix. In the high load condition,
the matrix was filled with a complex four-dot pattern (i.e.,
a “three-piece” pattern based on Bethell-Fox and Shepard
[41]). Miyake et al. [42] established that storage of similar
complex dot patterns burdens executive resources. In
the low load condition, the pattern consisted of three
dots on a horizontal line (i.e., a “one-piece” pattern)
which burdens executive resources to a smaller degree.
In order to draw attention to the importance of the
secondary task, participants were provided with feed-
back (i.e., correct/incorrect) each time they recalled
the position of the dots. Participants in the control
condition worked through the CRT problems without
performing a secondary task.
The AMAS and TAI were presented in a paper-and-
pencil format. The CRT was presented on the computer,
together with the DMT. Both tasks were explained to
participants, and they solved a practice problem before
working through the test problems. For the CRT, both
accuracy and reaction times were recorded. Immediately
after completing the CRT, participants were asked to report
the level of anxiety that they experienced while working
through the CRT problems on a 10-point scale (ranging
from 1 = no anxiety at all; to 10 = very high levels of anx-
iety). Participants were also asked to give an estimate of
how many out of the 8 tasks they solved correctly. The
average testing time was 35 minutes.
Results
Accuracy on the DMT was high in both the low load
(91%) and in the high load (93%) conditions. That is, par-
ticipants engaged in the secondary task fully. Preliminary
analyses suggested that low and high WM-load affected
accuracy and reaction times on the CRT to a similar
degree, and, thus, we report the results collapsed across
the two WM-load conditions. We also checked the pro-
portion of atypical (i.e., neither heuristic nor correct) re-
sponses on the CRT tasks. Atypical response rates were
extremely low (3.5%). That is, as expected, participants
primarily selected the heuristic and correct responses.
As a preliminary step for our main analyses, we
created high and low maths anxiety groups by per-
forming a median split, with participants with an
AMAS score of 20 or below allocated to the low
anxiety group (n = 46).
The purpose of our first analysis was to test the effects
of cognitive load and mathematical anxiety on cognitive
reflection. A 2x2 ANOVA with maths anxiety group
(high/low) and WM load (WM load/no load) as between-
subjects factors indicated a significant effect of maths
anxiety (F(1,88) = 8.68, p = .004, ηp
2 = .09), and a signifi-
cant effect of WM load (F(1,88) = 7.21, p = .009, ηp
2 = .08).There was no interaction between anxiety and cognitive
load (p = .74). Figure 4 demonstrates these effects.
In order to demonstrate that the effect of anxiety was
specific to mathematical anxiety, and was not a side-
effect of general test anxiety, we replicated the previous
analysis including test anxiety as a covariate. The effect
of test anxiety was not significant (p = .60). However, the
effects of maths anxiety (F(1,88) = 5.07, p = .027, ηp
2 = .06),
and WM load (F(1,88) = 7.36, p = .008, ηp
2 = .08) remained
significant. As in the previous analysis, there was no inter-
action between anxiety and cognitive load (p = .66).
Our next analysis investigated the effects of maths
anxiety and WM load on reaction times on the CRT. A
2x2 ANOVA with maths anxiety group (high/low) and
WM load (WM load/no load) conditions as between-
subjects factors indicated a significant effect of maths
anxiety (F(1,88) = 5.01, p = .028, ηp
2 = .06), but no significant
effect of WM load (p = .93), and no interaction between
WM load and anxiety (p = .42). Highly anxious participants
spent on average 17.31 seconds (SD = 5.08) on solving each
problem, whereas participants with low maths anxiety
spent 22.86 seconds (SD = 17.31) on average on each prob-
lem. However, WM-load did not have an effect on the time
that participants took to solve each problem b.
We also checked the effects of maths anxiety and WM
load on self-reported anxiety levels while working through
the problems. This was important in establishing that our
measure of general maths anxiety was actually related to
the anxiety of participants while they worked through the
cognitive reflection items. Note that measures of maths
anxiety are typically used in classroom settings, or in rela-
tion to arithmetic problem solving. In our study the CRT
tasks were not explicitly presented as maths problems,
and participants performed the tasks anonymously, which
reduced performance pressure.
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and WM load (WM load/no load) conditions as between-
subjects factors indicated a significant effect of maths anx-
iety (F(1,88) = 32.88, p < .001, ηp
2 = .28), but no significant
effect of WM load (p = .58), and no interaction between
the two factors (p = .91). Highly anxious participants’ aver-
age self-reported anxiety level was 4.91 (SD = 2.19) on a
10-point scale (indicating moderate levels of anxiety),
while the average rating of participants with low AMAS
scores was 2.52 (SD = 1.36), which reflected low levels of
experienced anxiety.
We also computed the correlations between self-reported
anxiety levels and participants’AMAS and TAI scores. The
correlation between mathematical anxiety and self-reported
anxiety was r(86) = .56, p < .001, whereas the correlation be-
tween self-reported anxiety and test anxiety was r(86) = .36,
p < .001. Importantly, the correlation between mathematical
anxiety and self-reported anxiety was still significant after
controlling for the effect of test anxiety r(85) = .45, p < .001.
By contrast, after controlling for the effect of mathematical
anxiety, there was no relationship between test anxiety
and self-reported anxiety while solving the CRT problems
(p = .78).
In our final analysis, we checked the effects of maths
anxiety and WM-load on students’ estimates of how many
CRT items they solved correctly. A 2x2 ANOVA with
maths anxiety group (high/low) and WM load (WM load/
no load) conditions as between-subjects factors indicated
a significant effect of maths anxiety (F(1,88) = 10.02,
p = .002, ηp
2 = .11), but no significant effect of WM load
(p = .11), and no interaction between WM-load and anx-
iety (p = .55). Highly anxious participants expected that
they solved 3.43 items correctly (SD = 1.32), and partici-
pants with low levels of anxiety expected that they solved
4.34 items correctly (SD = 1.68). In fact, participants in
both groups overestimated their performance (correct re-
sponse rates were M = 3.26, SD = 2.11 for low anxiety, and
M = 2.33, SD = 1.71 for high anxiety participants).
Discussion
In Experiment 3 the link between maths anxiety and
performance on the CRT was investigated together with
the effect of WM-load on performance on the CRT. In
line with our hypotheses, we found that both anxiety
and WM load were associated with relatively poor per-
formance on the CRT. The effects of WM load were
similar in the case of participants with high and low anx-
iety (i.e., anxiety and WM load did not interact). These
results are in line with earlier claims that anxious
thoughts regarding mathematical content act in a similar
way as WM-load [12,17] insofar as both WM-load and
anxiety are associated with performance decrements.
At the same time, our results also demonstrate that
the link between mathematical anxiety and cognitivereflection did not simply arise due to the working mem-
ory load imposed by anxious thoughts. Indeed, working
memory load in itself did not lead to reduced response
times (i.e., rushing through the problems), or to reduced
levels of confidence in one’s own performance. The latter
finding is especially interesting, given that performance
actually deteriorated under cognitive load.
Overall, these results suggest that mathematical anxiety
is associated with lower performance, reduced confidence,
and faster responses. It is also clear that the reduced avail-
ability of working memory resources does not result in re-
duced confidence or shorter reaction times. Nevertheless,
further investigations are needed to establish whether
there is a causal relationship between reaction times
and confidence levels. For example, one possibility would
be that participants rush through the problems, because
they do not trust in their ability to solve them, and, thus,
they do not expect that investing more time would im-
prove their performance. In the present study there was a
weak, but significant correlation between self-estimated
performance and reaction times (r(87) = .23, p = .029).
cHowever, once we controlled for the effect of self-
reported anxiety during the testing session, this relationship
disappeared (p = .18). Thus, the effects associated with
maths anxiety (i.e., reduced confidence and shorter reaction
times) might arise independently of each other.
Another interesting finding is that although WM-load
reduced cognitive reflection, it did not lead to increased
levels of self-reported anxiety. This suggests that whereas
increased anxiety is linked to reduced cognitive reflection,
a manipulation of cognitive reflection does not affect anx-
iety levels. This is in line with the interpretation that
maths anxiety reduces cognitive reflection. Nevertheless,
given that anxiety was not manipulated in our experiment,
we are unable to make strong causal claims. Indeed, it is
possible that a common underlying factor affects anxiety
levels and performance on the CRT.
As we described above, we found a negative associ-
ation between maths anxiety and reaction times on the
CRT. Thus, a potential explanation for the link between
the CRT and maths anxiety could be that cognitive re-
flection is reduced in anxious participants, because they
spend less time on the problems. In order to see if faster
responding is necessarily associated with decreased
performance on the CRT, we computed the correlations
between performance on the CRT and reaction times
separately for participants in the WM-load and no load
conditions. In the no load condition there was no rela-
tionship between reaction times and performance on the
CRT (r(29) = .10, p = .58). However, in the WM-load
condition, there was a strong, significant relationship be-
tween reaction times and CRT performance (r(56) = .49,
p < .001). This suggests that in the no load condition the
link between CRT performance and anxiety cannot be
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through the problems. Specifically, although anxious
participants tend to respond faster, this does not neces-
sarily lead to performance decrements in all participants.
However, under cognitive load, fast responses are
strongly associated with reduced performance. Thus,
rushing through problems might be particularly damaging
for anxious participants when they are distracted, or when
they are dealing with cognitively demanding tasks.
Finally, the fact that self-reported anxiety levels corre-
lated strongly with AMAS scores confirms the ecological
validity of the AMAS in predicting anxiety levels elicited
by word problems including numerical content, which
were presented in a low-stakes situation.
In our study we employed the DMT (a visuo-spatial
task) as a secondary task, because this task has previously
been found to increase participants’ tendency to rely on
heuristic responses in the case of tasks with a heuristic-
normative conflict [38,39]. However, it is worth noting
that Ashcraft and Kirk [12] used verbal load as a second-
ary task in their classic experiment looking at the effects
of maths anxiety and working memory load on maths per-
formance. It is also common in the literature to attribute
the effect of maths anxiety on maths performance to the
WM-load imposed by anxious thoughts and ruminations
(e.g., [13,43]). Based on these assumptions, it might seem
more reasonable to employ a verbal secondary load to
simulate the effects of maths anxiety. However, a study by
[44] demonstrated, using a dual-task paradigm, that both
verbal and visuo-spatial recall performance decreased as a
direct function of increasing cognitive load, regardless of
the nature of the cognitive load (i.e., whether it was spatial
or verbal). That is, based on these findings, verbal and
visuo-spatial activities seem to compete for a common,
domain-general pool of resources. Thus, performance
is affected in the same way, regardless of the type of
cognitive load.
In our study, we collapsed the results across the low-
and high WM-load conditions, as we found that perform-
ance across these two conditions was similar. The lack of
difference between the low and high-load conditions
was possibly the result of more variability in partici-
pants’ performance under cognitive load than in the
control condition (i.e., the response patterns were more
noisy). It is possible that this variability arose because
participants used different strategies to maintain the dot
patterns in their working memory, and some of these
strategies were more successful than others. Although
including a larger sample of participants could have
helped to decrease the noise in the data, our results clearly
show that employing a WM-load reduced performance on
the CRT, which is also in line with Toplak et al. [23] who
reported a relationship between participants’ performance
on the CRT, and their WM-capacity.Finally, we should note that our results do not exactly
match the pattern reported by [12] who found that the
arithmetic performance of anxious participants was dis-
proportionally affected by a WM-load. In this respect, we
should highlight that Ashcraft and Kirk [12] employed
relatively easy mental arithmetic problems, which showed
no effect of maths anxiety when they were performed
without a cognitive load. By contrast, the CRT is affected
by maths anxiety, even when it is administered alone.
Thus, the interaction in Ashcraft and Kirk’s [12] experi-
ment emerged because there was no difference between
participants with high and low mathematical anxiety
under no load, but highly anxious participants performed
more poorly than non-anxious participants under cogni-
tive load. By contrast, in our experiment the performance
difference was already present in the no-load condition,
and, thus, our results are not comparable to that of
Ashcraft and Kirk [12] in this respect.
In sum, although our study does not provide definitive
evidence that maths anxiety reduces cognitive reflection,
as we did not include a manipulation of anxiety, it
clearly demonstrates a link between the availability of
working memory resources and cognitive reflection. That
is, it provides a plausible explanation for how maths
anxiety could potentially lead to reductions in cognitive
reflection (i.e., through burdening working memory
resources). Nevertheless, our results also show that the
relationship between maths anxiety and performance on
the CRT cannot simply be explained as arising from the
WM-load imposed by anxious thoughts. Indeed, whereas
WM-load was only associated with performance decre-
ments on the CRT, maths anxiety was additionally linked
to reduced response times, and reduced confidence
in one’s own performance. These factors (i.e., faster
responding and reduced confidence), in turn, could have
independently contributed to the problems of anxious
participants with solving the CRT.
General discussion
In three experiments we tested the hypothesis that maths
anxiety is associated with reduced cognitive reflection. As
expected, we found that students with high maths anxiety
performed worse on the cognitive reflection test than
students with low levels of anxiety. This was the case both
for secondary school (Experiment 2) and university
students (Experiments 1 and 3). In fact, this effect was
still present when we controlled for participants’ maths
knowledge (in Experiment 1) or maths achievement (in
Experiment 2), and test anxiety (in Experiments 1–3). Our
last experiment also demonstrated a number of differ-
ences between low and high-anxiety participants in the
way they tackled the problems.
Specifically, in line with Ashcraft and Kirk [12] and
Mattarella-Micke et al. [17], we demonstrated that maths
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which were similar to the effect of working memory
load. To the best of our knowledge, our Experiment 3
is the only one, apart from Ashcraft and Kirk [12], to
demonstrate this through a dual-task manipulation,
and it is the first one, which demonstrates this in the
case of word problems including numbers.
Additionally, Experiment 3 also showed that mathem-
atical anxiety was related to reduced levels of confidence
in one’s own performance (see also [40]), and to a ten-
dency to rush through problems (see also [13,16]), which
resulted in shorter reaction times for anxious partici-
pants. Finally, we demonstrated that reduced confidence
and shortened reaction times did not arise as the effect
of hampered working memory resources.
These findings have several important implications.
First, our results demonstrate that maths anxiety arises,
and is associated with performance in low-stakes situa-
tions, and in the case of problems which do not include
mathematical symbols (other than numerals). Second, we
showed that the link between maths anxiety and cognitive
reflection was partially mediated by reduced mathematical
performance in anxious participants, as demonstrated by
the mediating role of general maths knowledge and maths
achievement in Experiments 1–2. Importantly, the first
two studies also showed that maths anxiety was still asso-
ciated with cognitive reflection once mathematical per-
formance and test anxiety were controlled for. This is in
line with earlier claims that maths anxiety is related to
participants’ ability to reflect on their own performance,
and to detect and correct their own errors (cf., [16]). This
could have been the result of the reduced availability of
cognitive resources, the reduced time spent on the prob-
lems and/or participants’ reduced confidence in their own
performance.
As we described in the introduction, the CRT is con-
sidered to be more than just a numeracy test (cf., [21],
although see [45]). Indeed, it correlates highly with tasks
measuring risky decision-making, future discounting,
and rational thinking [19,21,23]. Much research shows
the negative effects of low numeracy on judgement and
decision making [8,9], as well as on employability,
mental and physical health, and criminal behaviour
(e.g., [6,7]). The consistent relationship between maths
anxiety and cognitive reflection that we demonstrated
in our studies suggests that maths anxiety might also
be related to individuals’ decision making skills. In
fact, it is likely that maths anxiety is linked to individ-
uals’ economic behaviour, as well as their understand-
ing of risks. Although further investigations are
needed to establish more specifically what are the
decision-making situations that are most strongly
affected by maths anxiety, our results suggest that
besides the effects of numeracy, researchers of judgmentand decision-making should also take into account the
effects of maths anxiety.
It could be argued that our results that show a link
between maths anxiety and cognitive reflection are un-
surprising, given that maths anxiety has already been
found to be related to an increased reliance on heuristics,
reduced executive functioning, impaired mathematical
performance, and a tendency to jump into conclusions.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that these findings were
demonstrated in separate studies, whereas we provide evi-
dence for all of these claims, using a single task. Addition-
ally, our results are particularly informative with regard
to the claim that maths anxiety is linked to a tendency
for participants to rely on simple heuristics. A unique
property of the CRT is that, although the problems are
open-ended, the vast majority of participants (over 90%
in the studies that we reported above) produce either a
correct response or a typical (incorrect) heuristic response.
Although some researchers (e.g., [46]) argued that maths
anxiety led to an increased reliance on using simple heuris-
tic strategies, these claims were generally based on indirect
evidence (i.e., that high-WM participants, who were sup-
posedly more likely to rely on complex strategies than
low-WM participants, were disproportionately affected by
maths anxiety). The only exception is [47] who were able
to provide more direct evidence for the use of simple heu-
ristics under pressure. In Experiment 1 this evidence was
based on participants’ self-reported solution strategies,
and in Experiment 2 on participants’ performance on
Luchins’ [48] water jug task, where complex and easy so-
lution strategies could be discriminated. Our findings are
unique in that we measured maths anxiety as an individ-
ual differences variable (instead of experimentally manipu-
lating performance pressure). Additionally, the pressure
scenario used by [47] was not specifically aimed at indu-
cing anxiety about maths, but about participants’ perform-
ance in general. Moreover, we used a novel task, where
heuristic and correct responses could be easily distin-
guished without having to rely on participants’ self-report,
or having to prime participants by administering initial
problems.
Nevertheless, there are a few limitations of our stud-
ies which have to be noted. Although we suggested
that our results indicated a link between maths anxiety
and decision making, we did not actually include any
traditional measures of decision-making skills in our
studies. Thus, further research is needed to confirm
this prediction. We also did not manipulate maths
anxiety directly, which could have provided definitive
evidence for the causal link between maths anxiety
and reduced performance on the CRT. Additionally,
there is evidence that the link between maths anxiety
and performance on maths problems is dependent on par-
ticipants’ working memory capacity (e.g., [17]). However,
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experiments.
Another potential criticism is that our measures of
maths knowledge (in Experiment 1) and maths achieve-
ment (in Experiment 2) did not capture all the variance
associated with individual differences in mathematical
abilities, and thus, it is still possible that the link between
maths anxiety and the CRT is in fact fully mediated by
mathematical abilities. Although this is indeed possible,
earlier studies showed that numeracy was only one of sev-
eral factors that explain variance in the CRT (e.g., [25]),
and in maths anxiety (e.g., [13]). Additionally, given the
surface similarity between the correlates of maths anxiety
and cognitive reflection (most importantly, the tendency
to rely on simple, undemanding heuristics) it is unlikely
that any measure of maths ability would fully explain the
link between maths anxiety and cognitive reflection. Fi-
nally, our results suggest that there are several variables
which could potentially mediate the link between maths
anxiety and performance on problems with a numerical
content (including general mathematical knowledge, self-
confidence, and time spent on solving the problems).
Thus, further studies are necessary to disentangle the
causal links between all of these factors.
Finally, in each experiment we administered the AMAS
before the CRT. This order of presentation (i.e., to admin-
ister the maths anxiety scale before the presentation of
mathematical problems) is in line with the classic study by
Ashcraft and Kirk [12]. Nevertheless, one could argue that
drawing participants’ attention to their own anxiety could
have affected their performance on the CRT. An alterna-
tive option could have been to reverse the presentation
order. However, in that case one could have argued that a
correlation between performance on the CRT and the
AMAS was the result of participants’ reflecting on their
perceived performance on the CRT when answering the
questions in the AMAS. Another possibility would have
been to use a random order of presentation. However, we
believe that this is not appropriate in the case of an indi-
vidual differences study. Overall, we do not see an ideal
solution for the problem of presentation order. Neverthe-
less, it is worth considering this issue when interpreting
the results.
Although several questions remain to be answered, we
believe that our results contribute to a better under-
standing of the cognitive correlates of maths anxiety.
Additionally, these findings are also relevant for re-
searchers of decision-making and reasoning in terms of
our understanding of what cognitive reflection is. Since
its publication in 2005, Frederick’s paper on the CRT
has been cited over 700 times. Indeed, the CRT is an ex-
tremely popular measure, as it only takes a few minutes
to administer, and, at the same time, it is one of the best
predictors of rational thinking and decision-making skills.Nevertheless, our results clearly show that rather than
simply measuring a metacognitive trait, the CRT also has
a significant mathematics component (see also [25,45]).
Indeed, it is not only related to a person’s maths ability,
but also to their levels of maths anxiety. Thus, our find-
ings call for the urgent need for researchers to better
understand the cognitive bases of “cognitive reflection”,
and the tendency for people to jump into conclusions
without a second thought.
Endnotes
aInitially, 405 students participated in the experiment,
but given the low proportion of male students in the
sample, and the fact that previous studies reported
gender differences in both the CRT [19] and in maths
anxiety (e.g., [26]), we decided to restrict our analyses to
the female participants.
bWe also ran the analyses regarding accuracy and reac-
tion times on the CRT with the inclusion of the three
original CRT items only (which were administered as the
first three items of the extended scale), and we obtained
essentially the same results as with the extended scale.
These results are reported in [49].
cWe report this correlation collapsed across WM-load
conditions, as the correlations in the two conditions
were virtually the same.
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